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Friday, 23 June 2017

A Valuable Person



Recently, I read Jacques Maritain's article. 'The Person and the Common Good.' 
Maritain tries to make a case for the political value of the person beyond the individual loosely considered via the Liberal paradigm and the collectivist egalitarian vision. 

One of the compelling principles behind his argument is that person-hood is beyond the individual as a collection of rights and idiosyncrasies. 

Maritain writes, in his classically Thomistic way: 

'Here, in contrast to the expression of Pascal that "the self is detestable," the words of St. Thomas come to mind; "the person is that which is most noble and most perfect in all of nature." Whereas Pascal teaches that "the self is detestable," St. Thomas teaches whosoever loves God must love himself for the sake of God, must love his own soul and body with a love of charity. . . .

What do these contradictions mean? They mean that the human being is caught between two poles; a material pole, which does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of what, in the strict sense, is called individuality, and a spiritual pole which does concern true personality.


It is to the material pole, the individual become the centre of all, that the expression of Pascal refers. St. Thomas' exerpt on contrary refers to the spiritual pole, the person, the source of liberty and bountifulness. Thus, we are confronted with the distinction between individuality and personality.'


What is important to notice about this, is that via Aristotle and his descendants a critical principle made known to us is that the individual person as a valuable and unique entity in a relational sense. This relational sense may arise from social and political relations as Aristotle informs or out of the unique capacity for relations between the individual, community, and God as Aquinas informs. This can be expanded through a broader concept of the individual as the full instantiation of the community in the shape of history, tradition, family, prejudice, faith, and culture more broadly. These are the things worth preserving to conservatives. Because these varied and diverse elements and traditions infuse us with a shared culture and person-hood intelligible to people from a specific time and place. 

These are the elements worth preserving because they create the type of person we would like to see as the bedrock of our societies and politics, and they ask us to consider and think about more than what exclusively pertains to us our values or judgments or our opinions. They ask us to think of how our actions affect others and our political community. Individualism does not see this. It sees the individual as the absolute entity at the expense of all others and in turn undermines the above components of his own personality. The collectivist vision fails because it does not produce a humane community or individual that allows both to mutually benefit one another and produce a viable political community. 

A bit of a hybird article, perhaps a little confused. Still, some thoughts for you. Does conservatism better relfect an undestanding of person-hood that individualism does not? 

--Cole

Friday, 16 June 2017

Truth Doesn't Dress in Drag




Apologies in advance to readers, but I cannot figure out how to re-post the horrific video on which I am speaking. I’ll link it here: Drag Queens Lead Story Time at Edmonton Public Library.

The video focuses on a public reading of various novels to be about 150 children in the public library by drag queens dressed in clown makeup. Keep in mind the whole event took place at a public library. A library that acts on behalf of a municipal government and recieves public funding. Publlic funding that is directed toward propogandizing to your children. One of the Drag Queens states, ‘TJB said it's important to broaden childrens' horizons in a way that lets them know they should be themselves.’ What is wrong with this statement? Its not just about acceptance, but grossly ignorant about the development of children and gender fluidity.

These drag queens like to assert that this demonstration gives children a chance to accept and identify with alternative lifestyles (which are accepted as positive without challenge). But it also has a more insidious nature. Note the following statement.

"Edmonton's still a very conservative climate and so again, for young impressionable children who may not be fitting into the binary boxes in the world, it's very important for them to have examples of people and places they can grow into that are inclusive," TJB said. 

The goal isn’t just for children to have a positive role model, but rather to undermine the insidious binary conservatism of Edmonton and Alberta. Yet, these queens do not take the time to ask why or if the conservatism, which itself is muted and weak in Edmonton, exists for a good reason or not. Rather, it is an implicit negative that must be undermined and whether or not liberals acknowledge it or not, they need to target the children.

Never mind the fact that children tend to grow into heteronormative gender roles over time. Children who question their identity overwhelmingly conform to their biological sex over time because sex and gender are explicitly and immutably linked and to say so is a falsehood. To say so is to undermine truth itself. This comes at the expense of children.

According to an important report published by Lawrence Mayer and Paul McHugh in The New Atlantis, “There is also little evidence that gender identity issues have a high rate of persistence in children.” In fact, about 80 percent of children who experience transgender feelings completely resolve their difficulties without any intervention after they reach puberty. To say that transgender identities are fixed and unchanging is simply inaccurate.

They learn that a lifestyle even when treated surgically leads to gross unhappiness, depression, and epidemic suicide rates. They are literally teaching children to normalize their own pathological condition and adopt it themselves.

Why?

Because children are impressionable and people push back against the horrible assertions that things like gender, biology, socially defined norms, and normative ends for human beings ought not to exist despite the fact that they are self-evident and beneficial. The argument for radical acceptance of everything under the sun that belongs to a sole individual as a right and normal undermines the reality that people who live this lifestyle are in a tiny minority.

I suggest that the tiny percentages of people who adhere to this grotesque alternative lifestyle are not normal, ought not to be normalized, and though they are entitled to life and liberty, they are doing a devastating thing in annihilating the inchoate sense of self these children are beginning to develop all for political ends which seek to transform public opinion and destroy the idea of truth itself.

This whole event, strangely enough, is more for the drag queens than the children. They are up there, consciously or not, seeking validation. Observing 150 smiling children glowing with approval of their horrible lifestyle might be the only time these freaks feel good about themselves. It gives them a bubble outside of society that says innocent minds cannot comprehend my depravity so it must be okay. 



Friday, 9 June 2017

Slaying the Serpent and Disavowing Video Games

My House: Two TV's Two Console's One Problem

This may be considered a little bit of a short puffy piece, but I promise you it is substantial. I am writing today to tell you that I have been attempting to cold turkey my way out of the grasp of video games. 

I have spent most my life playing on these delightful programs and grew up with the old Sega Genesis before graduating to Nintendo 64, Playstation 2, Xbox 360, and Xbox One, (a little PC master race on the side as well: those Paradox strategy games, oh boy!) and I determined that my growing brain fog, lethargy, and flagging motivation to do anything productive necessitated I quit the horrible things. 

The real catalyst was my reluctance to write, the failure of my creativity, and the fact that I had virtually quit reading any significant quantity of books outside of the mandatory. I used to be both a prolific writer and reader (and loved every second of it) and I had a growing fear that video games were degrading this precious hunger. 

This quitting was more difficult because it had a significant social element. I grew up playing with friends constantly, as well as my father (who introduced me to the things in the first place and remains an avid competitive gamer of sorts), and with this level of ingratiation any rejection of these devices became something more. 

A good bye to memories. 
A good bye to nostalgia. 
A good bye to escape and immersion.

And I guess this quitting has come here because to put it mildly, its taxing. I have hidden the cables to the Xbox's (yes plural I own 2 Xbox One's) and they call at me all the time demanding to be played and loved.  

The urgency to quit games was compounded by the writings of the University of Chicago Economist Erik Hurst. Hurst who has spent much of his recent time studying the effect of video games on the flagging productivity of young men tells us 'Between 2000 and 2015, the employment rate for lower-skilled men and women between the ages of 21 and 55 fell by 7.5 percentage points,' and that generally young people don't mind. He attributes this change to the growth of cheap and immersive leisure the most readily available and appealing to young men being video games. Why compete aggressively in the world or focus on real achievement when you can level up your character or unlock one more gun in Battlefield or Call of Duty? 

Stephen King in his memoir and writing manual On Writing tells an aspiring author to 'read a lot and write a lot' if you want to succeed in the business, but why write something that you feel is important when you can just play Gears of War with your buddy on the couch? Its not that I think, or Hurst it seems, thinks video games are too toxic its simply that their opportunity cost is much too high. Young men including myself are just too dizzy in a techno haze. I don't want to be a statistic I want publishing credits, a public voice, ambition, a career, and a family. Video games do nothing but impede those goals.  

On the bright side I feel its working otherwise, I wouldn't be struggling to begin a new novel or writing on this blog! So for those who are wrestling those same demons kick them! hide the consoles, smash the PC delete your Steam account! and tell me how you did it! 

Thursday, 8 June 2017

A Comparative Exegesis of John Locke and Thomas Aquinas

The Laws of Nature and the Purpose of Politics in John Locke and Thomas Aquinas

John Locke
St. Thomas Aquinas

This post is composed of a brief undergrad essay I composed a number of months ago. Despite its antiquity, I feel that it neatly expresses some of the differences between the modern understanding of politics and the classical understanding of politics; this bifurcation in this instance is centred on two canonical authors in the history of political thought Thomas Aquinas and John Locke. A few brief points will aptly summarize the text for those who want a little background. 

Firstly, the focus is on the difference between the law of nature as understood by John Locke in his 'Second Treatise on Government' and Thomas Aquinas's various writings on the natural law. Despite the semantic similarities these concepts are significantly different, and often misunderstood. 

Secondly, the principle argument here is that John Locke's understanding of politics is necessarily hallow when placed in relation to the classical understanding of politics as an outgrowth of nature itself that serves as the measure of the political community and is necessarily normative. This natural law or normative law expressed through nature, the position of Thomas Aquinas, produces the individual through the emergence of politics. Meanwhile, Locke limits politics to the protection of man and his property or perhaps more properly phrased his liberties and natural rights a novel and modern concept that had no meaning to the classical thinkers. This is one of the great articulations of instrumental politics or politics at the service of the pre-political individual who contracts into society as opposed to holistically originating within it. 

Thirdly, as may not be totally clear as the essay is rather objective, I support the Thomistic position in general. My personal biases should not, however, prevent any reader from deriving their own conclusion. 


To Thomas Aquinas and John Locke, politics as they understood it, was deeply rooted in nature, both human and earthly: one sought to align human life with nature, the other sought to escape its inconveniences.[i] To Thomas Aquinas, politics could not succeed without an antecedent natural law that informed the laws of the political community, and human life in general. Alternatively, to John Locke, the law of nature, was a proscriptive fact, one that informed human beings of their natural right and placed limits upon their actions.
Accordingly, Thomas Aquinas integrated human law into the natural law and in so doing made it not just the measure of politics, but a prescriptive authority in all human life.[ii] The natural law, to Aquinas, became both a ‘rule and measure’ to inform human law and the principles of justice, and because these principles of justice existed not just to protect the polity from discord but to assist the soul in the fulfilment of the virtues the natural law then became inextricably linked to political nature.[iii] Alternatively, to John Locke, the law of nature existed to inform us of our rights, and facilitate human cooperation via reason, and in so doing provided the necessary adhesive for political communities as well as the solvent to dissolve them.[iv] This potential to dissolve the political union, and thus the potential threat to politics arose out of man's right to himself and by extension the products of his body.[v] However, the potential dissolution of the government by recourse to natural right, and the state of nature, to Locke, did not dissolve society, only government.[vi] By conceptualizing Locke’s theory of government in this way it is possible to see the law of nature as threatening to politics if the politics of Locke are measured not by his own standards but those of Aquinas in accord with his understanding of natural law.
To reach the origin of politics and establish these two different accounts it is necessary to examine the qualities of nature as understood by both Aquinas and Locke. Nature, as understood by Aquinas proceeded society, and coexists with it, or as Aquinas stated ‘regarding human affairs . . .  things are just because they are right according to the rule of reason [which] is the natural law, . . . . Every human law has as much the nature of law as it is derived from the natural law.’[vii] Society arises out of nature as it takes the precepts of natural law and uses reason, which is the unique and natural quality of man, to determine the common good:[viii] in the case of man, this is the exercise of reason amongst a community of human beings.[ix] He could establish this end because to Aquinas nature is teleological, in that things are constituted for their ends, which are understood through the natural power of reason.[x] This was the purpose of political society for Aquinas. In addition, it should be noted that Aquinas did not conceive of governments as separate from nature or society. The government is a natural outgrowth of the order of human society, originating in the rule of the household, that is itself mirrored in divine order, for both the ruler and God relate to their subjects in the form of craftsmen who impose an orderly plan.[xi]
Locke offered a radically different conception of nature, however. To Locke, nature was a state which men occupy when they share no common superior amongst them.[xii] However, to their advantage, they are perfectly free and equal, subject only to the law of nature which is reason.[xiii] This entitles individuals to a natural right in their own bodies and by extension through the mixing of their labour with the earth all associated property, which Locke defined as ‘lives, liberties, and estates’ to be disposed of as they wish.[xiv] However, this state came with numerous inconveniences three in particular which made living in nature precarious: the vulnerability of an individual person and property; the partiality of personal judgment, and associated tendency toward inequitable execution of the law of nature; and the challenge of executing the law of nature in the state of nature. The former were all consequences of absolute equality and placed the natural state of freedom in jeopardy. Meaning that though ‘in the state of nature he hath such a right, . . . the enjoyment of it is very uncertain.’[xv] Without, hopefully, lapsing too deeply into anachronism one finds a definition of state in the Canadian Oxford Dictionary as ‘The particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time.’[xvi] Therefore, it is important to recognize that this distinction is fundamental to understanding nature and its law as interpreted by Locke. For nature is a condition, one that is defined by its temporality and its potential for withdrawal not from the law of nature but from the state of nature. Alternatively, nature, as perceived by Aquinas, is a keystone to a constant ontological whole of which the political world is a part.
These interpretations of nature in turn directed man and politics toward divergent ends. Each philosopher interpreted the limits of politics in a different fashion due to their different origins. To Aquinas, politics had its end in the common good, which mankind understood through rational principles derived from natural law in accord with the eternal law.[xvii] Natural law then served as a guide. A guide that permitted the extension of politics to the ends of man himself, and consequently, the polity had few boundaries regarding the coercive authority it could apply in the name of habituation of individuals toward living in concord with the common good.[xviii] This meant that politics embraced vice and virtue with the punishment of one and the cultivation of the other inextricable from the ends of the whole community of which the individual is subordinate. This account not only governed the multitude in a political body but the rulers as well, for ‘the best institution of rulers belongs to a city or kingdom in which one person is chosen by reason of his virtue,’ because virtue and reason were paramount to their ability to understand and direct the common good.[xix] The ruler, in fact, was defined by his relation and proximity to the will of God through a superior capacity to utilize reason to interpret and direct the community toward the common good. This was necessary because the individual emerged from the community and partook in it and only in the polity did such possibilities emerge.[xx]
Meanwhile, to Locke, the compact between peoples, created a society, and the designation of a legislature was the act whereby people enter into a political state by forming a government. This alleviated the inconveniences of nature, which were defined by the individual’s inability to protect persons and property.[xxi] Therefore, to Locke government was defined by its enforcement of the law of nature and limited by the natural right of persons. Therefore, government had a single end ‘the preservation of their property.’[xxii] Government to Locke, did not only disregard virtuous action in the traditional sense it did not even consider the character of the ruler or ruling body if such qualities are measured by those proposed by Aquinas. A good ruler, James I served as an exemplary measured by his adherence to the laws of consent and his ability to maintain the ‘wealth and property of his people’[xxiii] In this way, politics was subordinate to the individual in Locke’s political community, something that would seem unreasonable to Aquinas.
This subordination of politics to the individual in Locke’s writings can best be understood by reflecting upon the principle that brings man into the social contract and allows him to likewise leave it: consent.[xxiv] Consent was what defined the relationship between the individual and the political society. Consent existed principally in two ways, tacit and explicit, and the explicit consent of the individual is what brought him into the society; tacit consent kept both the individual and his successors within it.[xxv] Meanwhile, the society itself expressed its consent when it chose to designate a legislature or ruling body over it to execute the law of nature on its collective behalf.[xxvi] Then consenting is meaningful in that it is by definition an action and politics by extension is an activity of the individual who consented to his amalgamation within it. 
As a consequence of the limits of Locke’s political society, it sows within itself its own seeds of dissolution if its success is regarded in terms familiar to Aquinas. For politics as Locke understood it, must necessarily fail, for it did not concern itself with the ends of community and persons but rather left them indeterminate. To Locke, the state of nature was still ruled by reason, and this made it a state that remained viable to individuals, on account of their natural right, which remained their own within and outside of the political community.[xxvii] In addition, all that remained of the problem of government or politics for Locke is for the society to establish for itself a new legislature. Society could establish this new legislature by revoking the consent that it initially provided to the government. Consent, however, is binding insofar as the contract between ruler and ruled had not been violated by the ruler who placed himself in a state of war with the society when he intentionally, continually, and significantly violated the natural right to person and property afforded to each individual.[xxviii] If the ruler or ruling body acted in this fashion the constituent elements of the community had the capacity to return to the state of nature and the ability to appeal to heaven understood as violent revolution.[xxix]
Politics then, to Locke, is an instrument to man and may be reconstructed in a way that meets the criteria of rule. The law of nature then is not a threat to politics to Locke, but its measure, in that it determines the validity of the polity as constituted. This natural right did not exist to Aquinas, and therefore it was inconceivable to abandon the political state for a state with no superior authority. For human laws as Aquinas understood them do not govern all elements of life, as they did not govern conscience; however, collectively and in accord with the eternal and divine laws, they constrained man and guided his actions in a way implausible to Locke.[xxx] Likewise, Aquinas made it clear that though men were to participate in the polity, they were not able to reconstitute their government or expel unsuitable kings. He noted. ‘The division of the kingdom . . . was inflicted on the people as punishment for their many rebellions.’[xxxi]
Political society then, as Aquinas and Locke understood it was completely different. One was a part of an organic whole originating in a natural hierarchy intelligible and governed by divine will; the other was a human compact entered by individuals for the protection of their natural right to their body and the property stemming from it. Both conceptions originated in different interpretations of the essence of the natural law, one as a rational intimation of the divine will that is integral to all human beings and normative, in that it designates qualitative ends, and another which describes nature and man's relation to it through the exercise of reason. The latter then informed man of his natural right. This natural right served not as a guide to politics as Aquinas understood natural law, but rather a law of nature that persisted both before and after the institution of political society and delineated the limits of the constitution of government. In this way, by relation to a reasonable state of nature, man to Locke had recourse to that state if the authority failed to adhere to the duty of protecting those rights; in returning to the state of nature government could then be reconstituted to serve its instrumental purpose, which is the protection of property. To Aquinas, Locke’s political theory would be insubstantial, and if politics, as understood by Aquinas as a unifying and transcendent phenomenon participating in the divine, used Locke’s law of nature as its measurement it would necessarily lacking, and in this way, is not only the greatest threat to politics, but arguably not fully political at all. 



[i] Thomas Aquinas, St., Aquinas Treatise on Law, trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis, IL: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 39, 46-47; John Locke, "The Second Treatise of Government," in John Locke Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis, IL: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), §4, §6.
[ii] Aquinas, Aquinas Treatise on Law, 9,37, 55-56.
[iii] Ibid., 1-2, 72.
[iv] Locke, "The Second Treatise of Government," §6-§8,
[v] Ibid., §27-§30, §199.
[vi] Ibid., §211, §221-§222.
[vii] Aquinas, Aquinas Treatise on Law, 47.
[viii] Ibid., 6, 35, 47.
[ix] Ibid., 36.
[x] Ibid., 36.
[xi] Ibid., 5, 22-23.
[xii] Locke, "The Second Treatise of Government," §7.
[xiii] Ibid., §6.
[xiv] Ibid., §4, §27, §123.
[xv] Ibid., §123-§126.
[xvi] Katherine Barber, ed., Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1521.
[xvii] Aquinas, Aquinas Treatise on Law, 3, 6,
[xviii] Ibid., 5, 48-49, 54-56.
[xix] Ibid., 89.
[xx] Ibid., 3, 91.
[xxi] Locke, "The Second Treatise of Government,” §95, §123.
[xxii] Ibid., §124.
[xxiii] Ibid., 200.
[xxiv] Ibid., §119.
[xxv] Ibid., §119, §121.
[xxvi] Ibid., §134, §141.
[xxvii] Ibid., §88-§89.
[xxviii] Ibid., §207.
[xxix] Ibid., §241-243.
[xxx] Aquinas, Aquinas Treatise on Law, 48-49,  
[xxxi] Ibid., 59, 91.

Wednesday, 26 April 2017

Islam: And Why I Could Never Convert


Why Think on it?

So, I know it has been briefly mentioned before, but I wish to bring it up again more specifically. Lately, I have been pondering the hypothetical religious conversion that I think that I will one day likely undergo. This is because I consider myself a theist with some caveats. I am highly sympathetic to religion and feel much greater solidarity with the religious than irreligious people. I am a theist insofar as I believe in the God of Abraham, the Christian ideas of original sin and redemption through Jesus Christ, the oneness of God, and more. However, I am relatively theologically uninformed and this largely comes from being born into an atheist/anti-theist (at times) household. This has made any contact with the religious world infrequent and often frightening or confusing, and later frustrating at many points between childhood and adulthood. Regardless, I still seek to one day experience or enter into a meaningful relationship with God.

My question today, is given that I am in love with a woman who grew up in a Muslim household, and though she does not practice at the moment in any meaningful sense she does wish to embrace her religion more fully (and this is a religion I have criticized on many occasions), it caused me to reflect. The normal procedure in Islamic marriage is that men may marry people of the book without concern, but for women, out of nominal concern that their children grow up Muslims, man only marry a Muslim man. Thus, for an interfaith marriage to occur between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man it is customary for him to convert. Given that I love my girlfriend more than I can articulate and do not see potential for giving her up anytime soon, or at all I hope, then if she were to become obstinate about her faith, or family were to ask, it would be wise to know why I would not embrace that faith with her.  

Now, I do not want to tie any of this to the violence of the Muslim world or disparage Muslims. God knows I have met plenty of great Muslim people in my life. Therefore, out of deliberate choice, I will avoid talking about the terrorism infecting Europe and to a lesser extent the whole world. I won’t talk about demographic concerns or the lack of tolerance many Muslims espouse; nor will I bring up the abhorrent treatment of women in many Islamic societies more broadly. I think I can articulate other reasons why I would not convert that are personal and personal to my relationship.  

Necessarily Political

The first reason I give for my unwillingness to embrace the Islamic faith would be concerns over its necessarily political nature. What I mean by this is since Mohammed travelled to Medina he governed, and Islam as consequent needed a scripture that addressed government. This is a large part of the origin of Sharia and Fiqh (which is the interpretation of Islamic law based upon the scripture). Now, this is problematic not only because Islam has always been concerned with how to rule, but it also governs in the same body of laws basic concepts like how to approach prayer, and how to conduct one’s daily routine that does not exist in the same systematic form in other religions.

The Christian tradition and the scriptures are famous for emphasizing obedience to the secular law. Notably in, Rom 13: 1-7, where it is noted the authorities ought to be obeyed because of their appointment by God, and to Christians, one is to obey the law of the land in all but the most extreme circumstances. This teaching is found also in Peter 2:13-17 Figures like Martin Luther took this further. Where someone like Thomas Aquinas allowed for the expulsion of rulers who transgressed against the common good as understood by natural law (Aquinas, Baumgarth, & Regan On Law, Morality, and Politics 2002 185, 206). To Martin Luther the fall was so catastrophic that humanity could not be sure that poor political rule was not placed over them by God, and thus providentially; nor could a Christian rightly judge the intent of the ruler well enough to know whether he was evil of heart (Luther & Porter Luther: Selected Political Writings "Temporal Authority" 2003 51). This is a consequence of what historian Susan Schreiner called the fall of the mind. 

This same trend is visible in one of the foundational texts of Christianity by one of the greatest saints. St. Augustine. The City of God where much of the text concerns itself with the relationship between the consubstantial relationship between the earthly world and citizens of the holy city or the Civitas Dei. The citizens of the holy city reside with God and belong to him, but on account of humanity and the punishment of sin first, exist in the earthly world. They are pilgrims travelling through the world, and need not govern it. In fact, to Augustine government turned us away from God more often than not and led to sin. Instead, like Augustine, many Christian political theorists made room for two ends for human king one secular and one temporal. This can be seen in works like De Monarchia by Dante Alighieri, Defender of the Peace, by Marsilius of Padua, and Temporal Authority by Martin Luther among countless other examples. Christians are in direct transgression of biblical teaching when they attempt to legal mandate precepts of the faith. As Christ informs “my kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36).” Now, this interpretation may differ particularly regarding the pope, but the ideal is very different in either case. This is a result of Christ living and dying under the command of the Roman law. This gives a mandate to the law of the world because God himself lived and died under secular authority.

Apostasy

A second problem I have is that Islam is a one-way door. You do not generally get freedom of religion in Islam. This is because apostasy, and I understand interpretations differ, is generally considered a crime punishable by death. Even if it does not lead to death or criminal punishment it can far too often lead to shunning by communities and complete rejection by one’s society and family. This is something despicable and toxic in the religion and I cannot put a good spin or rationalization on it. Just to show that I am not making arbitrary or unfounded obligations it should be noted that 23 Muslim-majority countries maintain laws against apostasy in their criminal codes,  and many more unofficial killings particularly under the guise of honour killings occur routinely.


Finally, there is no concept of original sin in Islam in the way in which Christians think about it. Keep in mind I am not unaware that original sin is itself disputed in the Christian doctrine and not absolutely accepted, especially in the early church, and some associate it with the pernicious influence of St. Augustine of Hippo. My girlfriend and I have talked about as much. She notes that Adam repented and prayed hard and was forgiven and his original sin did not pass on through the generations. In Christianity, this scarring of our nature is permanent and constant. St. Augustine notes as much in Book I of his Confessions when he speaks of his infant greed and envy. Augustine taught that our will was broken and weak, but extant and could be strengthened by God; I would go further: I believe that the only capacity to truly be good comes from Gods irruption of grace and salvation through Christ there is in no way that Islam can rectify that, and in its own way it is rather pelagian thinking in that we can feel enough contrition to be absolved and forgiven on our own. This is a position that I reject entirely.

Conclusion


Well, I don’t really have that much more to say in brief blog post. But these are the essential reasons why I view conversion to Islam is impossible, and unwise. These are theological positions which, given my feeling of affinity toward Christian theology, cannot embrace. I hope even though I was rather obscure and superficial someone finds this post interesting and finds something to think about. 

Tuesday, 25 April 2017

Left and Right Discuss Politics #2 Drug Legalization and HealthCare

In this video, my good Friend Zach and I discuss the potential hazards of drug legalization, what conservatives ought to do, and how this will affect Canada in the future. We also briefly discuss the fentanyl crisis and the burden on healthcare and some ways to deal with those associated problems from within and outside the healthcare system. 

Finally, I briefly talk about the horrible book Robert Greene's Mastery, which I thought was a horrible disappointment. 




Monday, 10 April 2017

Left and Right Discuss Politics #1

My talk with friend Zach on the state of the world. We discuss Islamic theology, the populist movements in Europe and North America, outrage culture, the traditional family and more! I hope to do many more videos with Zach. We had an especially productive and interesting conversation about Islamic theology and its relationship to terrorism.

Zach is an Edmonton musician and close friend you can find his band at https://thedabsband.bandcamp.com/ support them and their new album they are amazing. I hope he will be a collaborative partner for the foreseeable future. It's nice to reach concord despite problematic differences in ideology and understanding, however, productive dialogue with others in the political spectrum is a key element in the maintenance of a free society. 


Sunday, 9 April 2017

Coffee With Conservative #4 Trump, Syria, Women Hate, Graduate School



I am not going to give a long disclaimer for this video.  I mostly discuss the state of conservative parties in Alberta and at the federal level.  Secondly, I spend some time talking about the Syria strike and Donald Trump. Finally, a  personal chat about whether to attend grad school. Hope you enjoy. 

My Personal Relationship With the Syrian Conflict and Other Thoughts



 Thoughts on Syria

Since day one I have had mixed opinions about President Trump. Part of me hailed the death blow for the progressive narrative, and the notion that history is a linear and ever liberalizing process, the other half of me was more confused than angry. I wasn't sure if the uncouth and demagogic nationalist that I saw on the television was as daft as he was inarticulate, but if that was the case I worried. 

Disclaimer aside,  POTUS Trump fired 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at  Shayrat air base in western Syria April 7, 2017. This was on the assumption that the Assad regime had again used chemical weapons to attack Khan Sheikhoun north of Homs. Though the attacks origin is disputed, some saying the rebels again like the gassing in Ghouta ( a suburb of Damascus) had chemical weapons in deployed when mishandled or damaged by explosives;, the fact is we don't know.  Either way these weapons, by the regime or the opposition were deployed, and the United States has made a shockingly antagonistic move in the eastern Mediterranean.

Cut Out the Perfidious and Immoral Allies

 After this attack it seems as though the anti-Assad rhetoric is in full swing, again, I am not sure this is wise nor useful. Nations of the west have aligned themselves with horrible regimes now and in the past. Everyone knows the United States, has been in the past and strange bedfellows with the disturbing Saudi Regime, the Duvaliers in Haiti, or Hussien's Iraq. 

Yet, when it comes to foreign dictators they seem free to condemn those whom do not ally themselves with the United States or receive support from the bugbear that is the Russian Federation; one of the only countries that does not toe the good globalist line.  

My point is it seems awful conspicuous and disgusting to assault the regime in Syria the one bulwark against the disgusting Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State, simply because they are the flavour of the week in terms of being a head of state that is not appreciated by the sitting president.

Cut your support from the despicable Arab dictatorships, all of them, POTUS Trump and then we will talk about throwing missiles in the direction of whom ever you want.

Shocking

Furthermore, this act of aggression by the United States hit a little closer to home than usual. My girlfriend who I love very very deeply is a Canadian raised in Syria/Lebanon, (she spent most her life moving between the two) much of her family including her father live in the area around Damascus, and despite the fact that I don't particularly like her father, knowing that her family is in danger, never mind caught in the middle of a potential super-power entanglement, makes me deeply uncomfortable. 

Its more trying when she hasn't seen the news and you inform her in a casual phone call that the United States just fired missiles on the place you grew up. Once she knew it wasn't on a population centre there was some relief however.

Happy Syrians

I wouldn't say I was initially surprised although, I may have been slightly confused when I saw on twitter a number of Syrians in Syria and in Europe about their gratitude for the missile strike. I hesitate to call them naive, but I do think they underestimate the potential complications of such an incident. particularly the fact that opposition forces might find themselves emboldened by such a move. 

Russian Tensions

Russia, is justifiably outraged at the President Trump's conduct. Its a shame that bilateral moves to form a peace agreement in Syria are likely to stall, but otherwise I am not sure I see how this could be horribly consequential for the United States. Russia simply does not have the international clout or the military to truly threaten the United States or stop it from acting unilaterally. I think they may have alienated a country that could have been a strong ally in the future, if a smart president had merely worked to reconcile the two nations and forgive the childish disputes between the EU and Russia instead recognizing its sphere of influence in the east, but now that option seems like a thing of the past. The United States should be no means expect to have free reign in the region however, as Russia leases the critical Tartus naval base in Syria. It is one of Russia's only warm water ports, and it sits beyond the Bosporus and Crimea, and is therefore critical. Russia will not abandon the region no matter what the future holds for the Assad regime. 
 
Confusion

Finally, I wonder if this is really in any way effective. Sure the Tomahawk strike was intimidating and shocking to western media. But it didn't cause significant damage to Syria's capacity to wage war. Instead, it seems like such a move will only push Assad to continue his killing with conventional weaponry, which if you are a civilian is inconsequential shrapnel or gas you are just as dead. The Shayrat Airbase is already running again, surprise, and Donald Trump is being questioned by his base while recieveing support from the hawk lobby in the Congress. It is a strange time. Finally, and President Trump should know this, unless he has miraculously detailed intellegence which tells him something no one else knows, is that if Syria falls, the United States tries to change the regime or cripples it, or anything else truly debilitating happens to the Assad regime then the extremists likely the Islamic State will take over. Is that the future we want even for those of us who do not live in Syria?

Friday, 7 April 2017

Essay: The Failure of the 1972 Equal RIghts Amendment



Hi, everyone, this is an essay I composed for a survey on American History. It's about the success of Phyllis Schlafly, and the new right alliance over the odious and disturbing Equal Rights Amendment. It is written from a moderate position and little rhetoric given its academic aims, however, as you likely know, I have a strong stance on these issues. I will concede though that an ERA amendment might actually have/ be a good thing for western countries, because of the marriage laws as they stand (eg) Post Canada Divorce Act's 1986 revision), I think a legal order that caters to the needs of women needs to be built on real marriage not the nonsense of no-fault divorce; if it is constructed on such a foundation then women have no obligations to man and family. Regardless, enjoy. 


On March 22, 1972, the United States Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment.[1] This began the ratification process; the ratification process itself ended in failure on June 30, 1982, despite it coming within fifteen states of success.[2] Furthermore, the amendment had overwhelming popular support, and it continued to have popular support in the years up to the failure of the amendment.[3] From this observation, several important questions emerge about how a movement, the success of which was taken as a given, managed to fail even after an extension of the ratification period by thirty-nine months in 1978.[4] Why and how did a concentrated defensive movement by opponents of the ERA obstruct the amendment and stop it from reaching ratification?
With this question in mind, a historical analysis of the campaign leads to the conclusion that the amendment, from its outset, once a coherent oppositional force emerged, was doomed to failure.  By carefully investigating the limits of the Pro-ERA campaign and its lack of both historical awareness and organizational capability in contrast to the anti-ERA campaign’s strengths in both organization and outreach relative to the limits and nature of the constitutional amendment process of the United States, the failure of the amendment takes on greater clarity.
The 1960’s and the 1970’s, were a time of unprecedented change in American social life.[5] This change impacted women in new and novel ways. The contraceptive pill, the legalization of abortion nationally in Roe V. Wade, and the publication of Betty Friedan’s the Feminine Mystique in 1963 (you can read chapter 2: Here to get a sense of the book) were all emblematic of the shifting social and gender relations in the United States.[6] Evidence for these changes is observable in the movement of American women, particularly educated women as opposed to the traditionally poor, minority, immigrant, and single women into the workforce in the period. By 1970, 3.1 million or 42% of American women over 16 were working, most were part of this new demographic compared to a relatively static percentage of 25% of women over 14 in the period between 1910 and 1940.[7] This shift gave rise to a reinvigorated feminist movement concentrated in educated and middle-class women;[8] as a result, women as a whole entered a debate about what it meant to be a woman in American society.
The debate between women centered on what was best for women, and whether women as whole were different by nature from men.[9] On these fault lines, women attempted to define what was in their collective best interest. If women did have a unique role in society, due to their nature and demeanor, then they ought not to pursue political or social goals on the same terms as men. However, if women were equal as individuals and in their nature then it meant full legal equality seemed to be the best option for women.[10] Evidence for this divide is found in the fact that campaigners both for and against the ERA agitated on behalf of different views about how best to realize the well-being of women, and women composed the principle activists on both sides of ratification debate.[11]       
From these initial changes in the social life of America, the newly coalescing feminist movement sought to achieve some form of substantial legal equality with men. This process began with the pursuit of piecemeal reforms throughout the states, but the initiators of this process and the organizations they formed, including NOW (National Organization for Women) in 1966 and ERAmerica later in 1976,[12] supported the amendment on the grounds that  proposing and passing legislation on an ad hoc basis in each individual state was insufficient for realizing their goals in a timely manner.[13] Given this frustration, these women proposed the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972 which stated ‘equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.’[14] This amendment passed quickly in congress with votes of 354 to 24 in the House of Representatives and 84 to 8 in the Senate; given the rapid legal changes proceeding in the country these activists felt confident in the success of the ratification process.[15] Opponents like North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin protested that the amendment “would abolish gender distinctions in military service, expose women to the draft, . . . force them into combat. . . ."rob" women of child support, alimony, and widow's benefits, and would require the use of mixed-gender prisons and "unisex toilets.’ But they were considered insignificant and quickly discredited.[16] Indeed activists felt so successful they did not assign resources for campaigns in the individual states.[17] This strategy seemed gratuitous as the ratification process raced along with 20 states ratifying in the three months and an additional ten within a year.[18]
Given these successes and the information gathered from national polls suggesting strong support for the amendment,[19] proponents of the amendment did not hesitate to make arguments in favour of legal equality in the public forum even on controversial issues such as women in the draft, access to abortion, homosexual marriage, and divorce settlements assuming women had come together on these issues.[20] However, state by state polling, especially in contentious jurisdictions like Illinois, told a different story. There 40% of women and 58% of men favoured the amendment in 1976. In non-ratifying states, the degree of support remained weak and quickly declined with women’s support falling to under 40% in 1978. [21] Many women opposed these reforms and there was confusion about the aims and goals of the feminist movement. When women and men were polled on support for the amendment in 1978 they found that 23 percent of the men and 26 percent of the women did not have an opinion.[22] Although resistance took time to coalesce, the public perception of the amendment was already uncertain.
In part, these complications and the failure to ratify the amendment in a timely matter stemmed from divisions within the leadership of the proponents. NOW and ERAmerica had different plans for achieving their goals, with traditional lobbying being the focus of ERAmerica, and NOW focusing on protest and civic agitation following the model of the civil rights activists to secure their goals.[23] In addition to the two major national organizations, radical women’s groups such as Redstockings, WITCH (Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell), and New York Radical Women emerged, and this led to swift condemnation from Betty Friedan and NOW.[24] NOW itself received criticism for undermining traditional lobbying efforts in the states.[25] The Democratic Party itself further contributed to the disunity among proponents; the party experienced upheavals during the period between ‘New Democrats’ and the old Democrats.[26] For example, when Eugenia Chapman attempted to secure Democratic support from Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, political expediency trumped ideology as men like Daley worked to secure the re-election of favoured candidates in the face of challenges from newcomers, even if this happened at the expense of the ERA and supporters like Chapman.[27]
These harms could have potentially been limited if the proponents of the amendment provided positive arguments that affirmed the benefits women would receive.[28] Instead, they remained rather vague or overly optimistic about the outcomes of the amendment and often failed to articulate a case that seemed suitable to people in all demographics. To Historian Bruce Schulman, the 1977 National Women’s Conference in Houston exposed just how divorced from popular opinion the women’s movement had become.[29] High achieving women assembled for self-exaltation of future successes and goals producing the pamphlet What Women Want, which touched on all areas of life, and confirmed suspicions that the feminist mission involved a complete restructuring of the social and familial order; meanwhile the ERA had stalled.[30]
Given the defeat of Sam Ervin in the Senate, it seemed overwhelmingly ironic that Ervin would reach out to Illinois lawyer, Republican party activist, campaign organizer, and successful author and publisher Phyllis Schlafly.[31] Schlafly’s movement gave a voice to what political scientists Virginia Gray and Pamela Conover called, a new bourgeoise.  This new bourgeoise was composed of middle-class men and women who had recently ascended from the working-class and found themselves exposed to the social transformation of the 1960’s and 1970’s.[32] Schlafly’s STOP-ERA campaign not only organized these people, but served as the foundation for a new political movement that would title itself the New Right, and it emerged out of the alliance she fostered of secular, religious, and pro-family conservatives.[33] To feminist proponents of the amendment, Schlafly was a conundrum, not only because of her consummate political abilities but because she lived a traditional life and believed in traditional social roles in the home while also maintaining a high profile liberated career in law and politics.[34] Schlafly’s example seems to potentially show just how difficult it was for proponents to support the contention that traditional family roles were incompatible with the modern woman.
One significant advantage emerged in the STOP-ERA campaign; Schlafly and her supporters were better able to secure support for their cause because they were fighting a single-issue campaign. They fought against one motion and could counter it with diverse, and occasionally hyperbolic arguments about consequences, which to opponents of the amendment at least, seemed logically consistent with the wording of the legislation.[35] Schlafly and her supporters played off topics as diverse as the idea that the states would be forced to fund and endorse abortion, that states rights would be violated, that women would lose their traditional support in divorce, that women would become subject to the draft, and that private property itself was under attack.[36] Compared to the failure of the proponents of the amendment to argue effectively for the necessity of an amendment, the opponents’ rhetoric looked fierce and moved people by a much more compelling force: fear. This can be seen most notably in the plunging support for the amendment with a 30% decline between 1976 to 1980 with less than three-fifths of women supporting the motion in non-ratified states after the initiation of the STOP-ERA campaign.[37] The movement to halt the ERA looked more effective once a handful of states expressed interest in rescinding their support after initial votes for the amendment.[38]
Given the passion Schlafly and her STOP-ERA supporters had, it is unsurprising that they used novel means to organize and efficiently capitalized upon the plurality of structures available to them to reach out to people at the grassroots level while also securing the legislative votes necessary to prevent the passage of the amendment. This state by state campaign focused predominately on lobbying as well as securing the election of state legislators who supported the cause of the Schlafly alliance. They did this by capitalizing on the political action committees (PACS), which given recent changes to campaign funding legislation became an extremely effective means to gather funding in support of candidates.[39]
Meanwhile, they waged a ground campaign, going door to door. and working by mail order,[40] which became crucial given that media support for the STOP-ERA cause was marginal outside of conservative journal’s like the Phyllis Schlafly Report and the National Review.[41] This did not mean that the campaign of ERA opponents received no coverage, however, as news media by 1973 mentioned Schlafly in the majority of ERA reports and articles on the debate. Likewise, ERA opponents still received substantial coverage in women’s publications.[42] Meanwhile, the Viguerie Company, an engine of the conservative movement, demonstrated the power of direct mail when it managed to send over four million letters to conservatives and inundate one official with over 720, 000 letters.[43] In this way, Schlafly proved successful in reaching many middle-class homemakers and women concerned about the amendment. She did this in part by working with Church’s and other institutions as well ad hoc groups and national groups at the local level such as National Council of Catholic Women, Women Who Want to be Women, and the Family Preservation League, while leading the national campaign in a strictly hierarchical fashion.[44] In addition, through Christian associations such as Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, James Robinson’s Religious Roundtable, and Pat Robertson’s Christian voice, they could reach a subscriber base of over 560, 000 when coupled with the reach of the Schlafly Report (initial) 3000 subscribers and National Review they were able to contact a broad and motivated base.[45] This tied into another key advantage, the opponents of the amendment consistently demonstrated greater political knowledge on average and a greater readiness to vote in state and local campaigns.[46]
To understand the failure of the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment one final observation is necessary; the difficulties of the proponents have been contrasted with the efficacious organizational methods of the New Right opponents of the amendment and this contrast exposes necessary consequences. Though the bottom up campaign waged by the Schlafly STOP-ERA movement was fierce and effective, there can be no doubt that it only showed itself as truly effective in the context of the ratification process itself. A constitutional amendment in the United States is a necessarily trying thing, as historian Elizabeth Perry makes clear. She cites the times to ratification for various amendments into the constitution studied by Mary Berry;[47] the amendments concerning prohibition, Women’s Suffrage, and slavery took 72, 108, and 57 years to pass successfully.[48] Meanwhile, one need only look at the arduous history of the 1923 Equal Rights Amendment proposed by Alice Paul to see that when constitutional challenges entered the public forum opposition would always be fierce and ratification difficult.[49]  Furthermore, states with high Mormon populations in the west Nevada, Arizona, and Utah, as well as the Democratic bastion composed of the former confederate states, had proved virtually impenetrable to prior amendments, and in the example of the 14th amendment success only came with circuitous methods.[50]
These issues would have been less burdensome if there had been plans for a national campaign in support of the ERA working on a state level, or if proponents had built up stable bases of support in individual states before asserting their cause at the national level,[51] but this was not the case. Instead, feminists and proponents of the amendment lobbied congress for the passage of an amendment without fully convincing the public of its necessity, and in being too optimistic about the prospects failed to recognize the gradual social shift taking place in reaction to the changes of the prior decade.[52] They failed to notice trends like the shift from moderate Methodist, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian Churches to new evangelic and fundamentalist Churches that saw explosions in their congregations over the same period.[53] Nor did they effectively rectify themselves to the historical difficulties intentionally placed in the amendment process, and their opponents who in only needing to secure 13 states against, had the strategic advantage from the outset.[54] The rise of the New Right and the conservative resurgence of the 1980’s under the leadership of Ronald Regan revealed the degree that pro-ERA activists misjudged the public mood and the complexities of ratification as a whole.[55] 



[1] David E Kyvig, "Historical Misunderstandings and the Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment," The Public Historian 18, no. 1 (Winter, 1996): 45.
[2] Ibid., 45-46.
[3] Donald T Critchlow and Cynthia L. Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered: Politics, Policy, and Social Mobilization in a Democracy," Journal of Policy History 20, no. 01 (January 2008): 162-163; Pamela J. Conover and Virginia Gray, Feminism and the New Right: Conflict over the American Family (New York: Praeger, 1983), 8.
[4] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 45.
[5] Philip Jenkins, A History of the United States, 3rd ed. (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 285; Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: the Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002) 11-12, 162-163; Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 3.
[6] Jenkins, A History of the United States, 284; Maldwyn A. Jones, The Limits of Liberty: American History, 1607-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 585.
[7] Jones, The Limits of Liberty, 284.
[8] Schulman, The Seventies, 162-163.
[9] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 52; Laura R. Woliver, "The Equal Rights Amendment & the Limits of Liberal Legal Reform," Polity 21, no. 1 (1988): 185; Elisabeth I. Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA," Canadian Review of American Studies 18, no. 3 (October 1987): 395; Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 10.
[10] Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 10.
[11] Ibid., 9.
[12] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 170; Jones, The Limits of Liberty, 585.
[13] Jones, The Limits of Liberty, 585-586
[14] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 45.
[15] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 51; Mary F. Berry, Why Era Failed: Politics, Women's Rights and the Amending Process of the Constitution (Bloomington, I.N: Indiana University Press, 1988), 63-64. It should be noted that Berry’s text reads passage in the house as 354/23 as opposed to 354/24. I was unable to identify the reason, or access the microforms of the congressional record, to identify the error. However, NOW lists the vote in the house as 354/24 "Chronology of the Equal Rights Amendment, 1923-1996," NOW.org, 2017, accessed March 18, 1017, http://now.org/resource/chronology-of-the-equal-rights-amendment-1923-1996/.
[16] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 51.
[17] Berry, Why Era Failed, 65.
[18] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 45.
[19] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 162-163; Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 8.
[20] Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 397; Matilda Butler and William Paisley, "Equal Rights Coverage in Magazines, Summer 1976," Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 55, no. 1 (Spring, 1978): 158; Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 169.
[21] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 158, 163.
[22] Ibid., 163.
[23] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 159; Schulman, The Seventies, 164.
[24] Schulman, The Seventies, 164-165
[25] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 170.
[26] Ibid., 162.
[27] Ibid., 162.
[28] Berry, Why Era Failed, 68; Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 395, 297.
[29] Schulman, The Seventies, 186.
[30] Schulman, The Seventies, 186-187.
[31] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 51; Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 165.
[32] Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 68-70
[33] Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 77; Schulman 187-188, 193, 201-202; Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 165.
[34] Schulman, The Seventies, 169.
[35] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 166.
[36] Phyllis Schlafly, "How ERA Would Change Federal Laws," Phyllis Schlafly Report, (November 1981 Vol 15. No 4. November 1981) Accessed March 18, 2017, http://eagleforum.org/publications/psr/nov1981.html.
[37] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 163.
[38] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 58.
[39] Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 91-92.
[40] Butler and Paisely, "Equal Rights Coverage in Magazines,” 158-159; Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 91.
[41] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 165-166; Schulman, The Seventies, 195.
[42] Butler and Paisely, "Equal Rights Coverage in Magazines,” 159; Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 75.
[43] Schulman, The Seventies, 198.
[44] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 165-166, 167; Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 398.
[45] Conover and Gray, Feminism and the New Right, 76.
[46] Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 163-164.
[47] Berry, Why Era Failed, 2-3, 56; Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 396.
[48] Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 396.
[49] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 49.
[50] Berry, Why Era Failed, 9; Critchlow and Stachecki, "The Equal Rights Amendment Reconsidered,” 160; Schulman, The Seventies, 170.
[51] Berry, Why Era Failed, 64.
[52] Kyvig, “Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment,” 52, 62; Perry, "Scholars Confront the ERA,” 394, 397.
[53] Jenkins, A History of the United States, 288-289.
[54] Woliver, "The Equal Rights Amendment & the Limits of Liberal Legal Reform,” 194.
[55] Schulman, The Seventies, 187-188; Jenkins, A History of the United States, 288-289.